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Given that challenges on the issue of socioeconomic development faced by countries in subSaharan Africa (SSA) have been identiﬁed as critical to strengthening the inherent link between
governance and socioeconomic conditions, this study examines the interconnections between
governance and socioeconomic conditions in SSA. With a focus on 25 countries in SSA between
2005 and 2019, we conduct the analysis based on the Panel-Corrected Standard Error and System
Generalized Method of Moments estimations and panel causality tests. The results show that SSA
does not seem to have the means of effective governance to spur improved socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, the pervasiveness of institutional problems in many countries of SSA has been
responsible for the poor socioeconomic conditions in the region. Likewise, governance quality and
socioeconomic conditions are found to inﬂuence each other. An improvement in socioeconomic
conditions could result in better governance quality. On the other hand, governance quality is
viewed as a vital ingredient in achieving needed socioeconomic development outcomes. Thus, it is
suggested that there is a need for countries in SSA to streamline governing systems toward
engendering improved well-being. The introduction and implementation of transformative policies through effective governance are also necessary for ensuring critical structural changes and
increasing social service provision. Overall, there should be a proactive identiﬁcation of ineffective
policies and procedures by policymakers to enhance meaningful impacts in the region.

1. Introduction
Public discourse on the issue of critical governance has revealed the need for the adoption of an effective approach to addressing
institutional problems for meaningful development to take place (South African Institute of International Affairs, 2009). In this respect,
understanding the link between governance and socioeconomic conditions in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remains crucial in the literature,
because effective development may not depend on the type of government, but on the quality of governance or on the character of the
state. It should, therefore, be noted that the extent to which the interconnection between governance and socioeconomic conditions is
perceived would depend on how socioeconomic crisis is understood. Broadly, socioeconomic crisis means the factors or conditions that
have an adverse inﬂuence on individuals’ social and economic activities, including health issues, lack of education, disaster, racial and
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religious discrimination, poverty, overpopulation, unemployment, political unrest, and corruption. In this case, growing poverty and a
dysfunctional economy with massive unemployment, exacerbated by a lack of even the most basic human rights and fundamental
freedoms, could place the concerned economy at a low level of human development in the long run. This view is most notably advocated
by Merton (1949). The successful track record of economic development is well known. However, based on extant studies, we can
conclude that Africa’s institutional environment appears to be weak and unchanged in the past few decades (Fayissa and Nsiah, 2013; Al
Mamun et al., 2017). Does this imply that a governance framework and some policy measures do not matter for economic performance?
A deeper understanding of Africa’s development gap is essential given the paucity of development-oriented decisions and the necessary
capacity that could allow for improved economic performance; the latter is facilitated by signiﬁcant changes to the mechanism of
accountability and transparency in the public sector and by collective leadership. Indeed, Africa’s experience indicates the need to give
more attention to how public institutions perform and less attention to the speciﬁc forms the institutions take. Because Africa now faces
a huge institutional gap, maintaining accelerated growth and avoiding “socioeconomic crisis” require the political will to switch to
effective institutional arrangements that could guarantee a sustainable development model (Governance and Social Development
Resource Centre, 2010).
The literature widely recognizes the adverse effects of weak governance systems on the poor. The failure to institute effective propoor social policies is the outcome of the unresponsiveness of state institutions (The World Bank, 2001); governance failings are most
inimical for the poor, and the increasing frequency of humanitarian crises is inevitable. It is therefore implied that the signiﬁcance of
governance quality seems to have become almost axiomatic (Kadhim, 2013) based on the indispensability of governance in the
maintenance of sustainable growth and development. Within the context of developing countries, ineffective governance is the root
cause of numerous economic, political, and social crises (Jreisat, 2002). Effective governance, which entails proper monitoring and
better coordination of economic activities, is lacking in most African countries, including inadequate enforcement of contracts and the
failure to establish propriety rights for the promotion of economic development (Lahouij, 2017). Governance improvement is vital to
addressing overwhelming socioeconomic challenges in SSA (Fagbemi and Asongu, 2020). Hence, as Africa’s Agenda 2063 gains traction, coupled with the attainment of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the state of governance in African
countries has been a timely issue in view of the fact that the major obstacle of development in the continent is poor institutional quality
(AlBassam, 2013; African Capacity Building Foundation, 2016). Indeed, the availability of the required standards to successfully
implement and enforce provisions depends largely on the prevailing institutional factors. Considering the prominent role of institutions,
the link between institutional arrangements and socioeconomic development needs to be given more practical and scholarly attention.
State capabilities should be conceived as the ability to coordinate policies that could drive structural change in economic and social
ﬁelds and are critical to ensuring long-term economic growth and development (Mira and Hammadache, 2017).
In this context, good governance1 is a fundamental component of Africa’s resurgence, as the structural change and tremendous task
of socioeconomic development seem related to it (African Capacity Building Foundation, 2018). Africa’s peculiarities and socioeconomic conditions require the adoption of optimal strategies to reform governing systems and attain sustainable socioeconomic
development. There is a consensus recognizing that, to improve efﬁciency and social service delivery in Africa, raising accountability
and maintaining political stability (POL) have become more central in recent times given the increased poverty, poor governance,
growing insecurity, and pervasive corruption (African Capacity Building Foundation, 2018). Despite this, studies on the link between
governance quality and socioeconomic development are limited, as much of the literature on the quality of institutions is concerned with
its effect on economic growth, not on socioeconomic conditions themselves. For instance, several scholars (Dahlstr€
om et al., 2012;
Fayissa and Nsiah, 2013; Liu et al., 2013; Shao, 2016; Adedokun, 2017; Setayesh and Daryaei, 2017) commonly based their discussions
and ﬁndings on how economic growth is inﬂuenced by governance, indicating that limited attention has been given to the linkage
between institutional quality and socioeconomic development in the literature. In addition, Tang and Abosedra (2014) and Ramadhan
et al. (2016) stressed the relationship between POL and economic growth, while Gani (2011) and Salahodjaev (2015) explained the
nexus between voice and accountability (ACC) and economic growth. Thus, a more focused approach to research on how socioeconomic
conditions are inﬂuenced by governance in Africa’s context is crucial. This will help further an understanding of the continent’s
development challenges, thereby harnessing what stakeholders can proffer to facilitate good governance.
In spite of the fact that a number of points have been raised in the literature on the relationship between governance and economic
performance, African Capacity Building Foundation (2018) afﬁrmed that there has been uncertainty on the issue of causal direction.
Some previous studies have proved a positive causal relationship from institutional quality to economic development as well as positive
causality in the opposite direction (Chong and Calderon, 2000; Emara and Jhonsa, 2014). However, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) argued
that there only exists unidirectional causality from improved governance to higher per capita income. It remains unclear whether
economic development has led to improved governance or vice versa. Based on this, investigating the causal direction could give a more
pertinent understanding of what constitutes Africa’s governance challenges. Consequently, besides ﬁnding the nexus between governance quality and socioeconomic conditions in the African context, the direction of causality between the variables is also examined.
In this study, we selected two governance indicators (POL and ACC) out of six indicators of good governance (POL, ACC, government
effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption) based on the World Governance Indicators developed by
Kaufmann et al. (2010). These indicators were chosen following the growing centrality of the political issue and democratic accountability (Pereira and Teles, 2011). The governance indicators were rated on a scale, as appropriate, ranging between 2.5 and 2.5. The
causality test developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) was used to ﬁnd the interrelationship, while

1
Good governance means the consolidation of market-oriented reforms and the key prioritization of social service provisions to Africa's poor
(African Capacity Building Foundation, 2018).
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the System Generalized Method of Moments (System GMM) and Panel-Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimations were employed to
examine the effects of governance on socioeconomic conditions. The key signiﬁcance of the study is to extend knowledge of the role of
governance in African socioeconomic development trajectories; the major contribution to the extant literature is to provide an empirical
justiﬁcation for the link between governance quality and socioeconomic conditions in SSA to enhance the understanding of the region’s
main challenge. Furthermore, the study’s objective is essential for explaining the cause of the current socioeconomic development
outlook in SSA.
2. Empirical evidence
In the face of the precariousness of governance and the state of the economy, the African Union (AU) has listed seven key aspirations
in its 50-a development and transformation program (i.e., Agenda, 2063), tagged “The Africa We Want” (African Union Commission,
2015). Out of the seven key aspirations, in terms of interlinks, “an Africa of good governance”2 is indeed critical. In Agenda (2063),
although challenges remain, progress on the good-governance framework has been encouraging, as the key to Africa’s political and
socioeconomic transformation revolves around it. The AU recognized that, for the African continent to realize its full potential, good
governance, which is arguably the single most signiﬁcant factor in reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development, should be
well entrenched across countries (SAIIA, 2009). However, this development and transformative program seem not to have yielded
meaningful and sustainable outcomes following the series of institutional problems that continue to thwart development efforts in the
continent. While the state must guarantee the adequate provision of social services—basic healthcare, education, and perhaps, the
expansion of infrastructure, including communication, transport, and electricity—these characteristics have seriously eroded in Africa
today due to bad governance (Mbaku, 2020). Indeed, the types of reforms that can preclude dictatorship, corrupt behaviors, inefﬁciency,
and economic decline are yet to be ﬁrmly embraced and achieved by many countries. Poorly functioning governance structures have
persistently saddled countries (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018).
The pervasiveness of poor governance in most African countries has overwhelmingly frustrated the government’s corrective
intervention role in improving economic development. For instance, used to combat poverty and improve human development, the
maintenance of peace and security, as well as growth enhancement and wealth creation, have remained elusive. No doubt, if Africa is to
attain its developmental goals, it is pertinent that African countries entrench mechanisms that engender good governance (such as
constitutionalism, accountability and transparency, and democracy). Due to the ineffectiveness of governance, from 1990 to 2015, the
number of African people living in poverty rose from 2.78  106 to 4.13  106 (Mbaku, 2020). It is worrying that the African continent
has the largest share of people in extreme poverty (Brookings Institute, 2019). In terms of security and health, the greatest proportion of
Africans lack access to social protection and good health care (International Labor Organization, 2017). Only effective pro-poor policies
can curb this terrible poverty trend in the continent (The World Bank, 2019). In addition, according to the United Nations Development
Program’s Human Development Index, the least developed countries in the world are African countries, including the Central African
Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. This classiﬁcation, as determined by the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, is based on countries with relatively dysfunctional or weak
governance structures (United Nations Development Program, 2018).
Good and inclusive governance, which is a sine qua non for attaining sustainable development, is unlikely to be widely practiced and
entrenched by many African countries due to a lack of political will and bad leadership (Mbaku, 2020). When governance quality is
eroded, the state will be unable to put in place policy measures that can foster socioeconomic development and thus favor long-term
investment (SAIIA, 2009). Empirically, it has been found that both a low gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and a poor quality
of governance are predominant features of many African countries (Fayissa and Nsiah, 2013; Al Mamun et al., 2017). Hence, the
successful and effective implementation of socioeconomic development policies critical to achieving the SDGs in 2030 or Agenda 2063
is likely to be a mirage without sound institutional reforms to enforce optimal practices in the public sector (Mbaku, 2020). It is therefore
suggested that African countries with progressive and inclusive constitutions (such as Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa) secured through
the separation of powers can promote national dialogues to better understand their citizens on good governance to achieve sustainable
development (The World Bank, 2019; Mbaku, 2020). However, among the remaining issues is that many other countries in SSA have
persistently lacked the remedial mechanisms for discussing and charting ways to ensure that besetting governance problems are
addressed and cease to undermine the effectiveness of the state in promoting more progressive social policies (African Capacity Building
Foundation, 2016).
Given that an understanding of governance is a critical determinant of socioeconomic development, apparent contradictions in the
institutional context in explaining development trajectories across countries have attracted global attention. In view of this, researchers
including Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), and Kaufmann and Kraay (2003) demonstrated that some governance indicators, such as control of corruption, stability of property rights, or democracy, are strongly associated with the GDP per capita, human
capital development, or investment, buttressing the argument that a market-enhancing governance framework and economic performance are closely correlated. Nonetheless, these researchers emphasized that improved indices of good governance positively inﬂuence
economic growth and offer long-term convergence with countries regarded as developed. However, Khan (2004) argued that the
enhancement of good-governance indicators could lead to better economic growth rates when developing countries could create efﬁcient good-governance policies only after the period of learning in the states and after attaining a certain level of development.
Several studies support the hypothesis that governance quality inﬂuences economic performance. For example, Olson et al. (2000)

2

In this context, good governance entails democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law (Gisselquist, 2012).
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afﬁrmed that governance quality is signiﬁcant to enhancing investment rate, suggesting that improving investment climate and the
capital market are central to stimulating economic growth. In addition, other conditions identiﬁed as promoters of improved economic
performance through good governance include: a well-coordinated economic power structure that can engender the optimization of the
allocation of resources (Zhang and Yu, 2009); corruption reduction that encourages productive investment (Dahlstr€
om et al., 2012); a
political power structure that can affect the economic system and policy (Liu et al., 2013); and ﬁscal decentralization that enhances
ofﬁcial incentives and regional competition, which can also affect economic performance (Shao, 2016). Overall, the aforementioned
conditions indicate that governance can be viewed as social infrastructure, which is critical to the growth of economy (Fayissa and
Nsiah, 2013; Al Mamun et al., 2017) through governmental systems and policies. Indeed, Adedokun (2017) and Setayesh and Daryaei
(2017) stated that by hindering the “grabbing hand” of power while inducing the “helping hand” of power, good governance can be a
positive determinant of growth and economic development. In addition, Ahmad et al. (2012) tested whether or not corruption inﬂuences economic growth using panel data for the period 1984–2009 for 71 developed and developing countries. The results indicated
that high corruption lowers countries’ growth performance, suggesting that the quality of institutions has a signiﬁcant effect on the
examined economies. Similarly, Cebula and Foley (2011) argued that for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
countries, economic growth during the period 2003–2006 was positively affected by better regulatory quality as it allows for effective
functioning of the market and businesses.
Aisen and Veiga (2013) used a System GMM estimation for linear dynamic panel data models and stressed that, for 169 countries
examined between 1960 and 2004, POL and lower GDP per capita are strongly connected. Other studies conducted by Tan and Abosedra
(2014) and Ramadhan et al. (2016) showed a signiﬁcant relationship between POL and economic growth, while Gani (2011) proved
that the indicator of ACC has a signiﬁcant effect on economic growth. In contrast, Pere (2015) reported that there is a non-signiﬁcant
association between corruption and economic growth. In terms of causality, it was found that there is a relationship between institutional quality and economic development indicator (per capita income). Chong and Calderon (2000) contended that, although there is a
bidirectional causation between governance quality and economic growth, the causal effect of institutional quality on economic growth
is stronger. Emara and Jhonsa (2014) also examined the interrelationship between governance quality and per capita income for 197
countries, and found a bi-directional causality between them.
Regarding Africa, in particular, AlBassam (2013) showed support for the argument that institutions of political representation and
accountability determine the level of political and economic development in the continent. Aikins (2009) and Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) also suggested that policy responses should be based on an effective and efﬁcient governing system to promote sustainable
development in Africa. Gray and Khan (2010) found that the provision of adequate public goods and the possibility of strong socioeconomic conditions are the key elements of the developmental role of improved governance. On the other hand, Fagbemi et al. (2020)
stated that governance quality contributes to the level of poverty in Nigeria. However, African Capacity Building Foundation (2018)
conﬁrmed that, so far, there seems to be no consensus on the development of an optimal strategy that is fundamental to proffering a
lasting remedy to Africa’s poor governance. Hence, the above review opens the door for further investigation as the need to explain how
African governance systems affect the continent’s socioeconomic state becomes imperative. The argument that the pervasive socioeconomic crisis in Africa could be signiﬁcantly determined by the level of governance remains a subject of debate.
3. Methodology
3.1. Theoretical framework
The Solow model and new growth theory can directly or indirectly elucidate the improvement in economic performance resulting
from high institutional quality in the global economy. The explanation for this assertion is as follows. In the Solow model, a rise in the
availability of technology through improved quality of governance could contribute to economic performance. It is plausible that any
form of poor governance can adversely affect citizens’ psychological state or mental health as well as their productivity. For example,
irregular political changes can lead to uncertainty for investors and thus cause decreased economic growth. Consequently, in both the
short run and the long run, many negative effects may surface in the economy (Feng, 1997). However, with the mitigation of the
country’s risk, and the offering of good and consistent policy measures by the new government—which can guarantee the creation of a
better environment for local and foreign investors—major government changes may result in increased economic growth. In this
context, the stability of the political environment stimulates an increase in both human and physical capital accumulation, thereby
positively inducing the growth trajectory (Younis et al., 2008). In another argument, to properly enforce contracts, safeguard law and
order, and for market expansion to attain sustainable economic growth, democracy and political freedom are recognized as prerequisites
(Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990).3 In contrast, the operation of an authoritarian system—with its limited capacity as a centrally controlled
system that encourages corruption and wasted resources—negatively affects enterprise development (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990). In
view of these propositions, it can be reasonably assumed that good governance eliminates the physical and mental constraints associated
with bad governing systems and thus improves labor productivity. In addition, improved institutional quality offers an environment
conducive to both local and foreign investors. Arguably, the increased investment is brought about by improved institutions that could
be in the form of physical and human development. Through the learning process, human capital development (a factor that is closely
related to improved socioeconomic conditions), which entails the knowledge and skills acquired by individual workers, results in

3
For detailed discussion on three main schools of thought (such as conﬂict perspective, the compatibility perspective, and the skeptical
perspective) about how democracy impacts economic performance, see Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), Feng (1997), and Younis et al. (2008).
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increased output per worker (Romer, 2001). On the other hand, compared with the initial condition, increased investments in physical
capital cause a rise in the capital per worker. Through the process of capital accumulation, it is plausible that economic growth will
eventually be enhanced (Romer, 2001).
Regarding new growth theory, technology is identiﬁed as the harbinger of economic growth (Romer, 2001; Mankiw and Ball, 2011).
Under this condition, a rise in technological progress occurs in addition to the rate of knowledge accumulation. In this argument,
knowledge is generated by research and development (Romer, 2001). It can therefore be argued that sound institutions in the form of
the proper enforcement of property rights will stimulate investment in research and development, thereby leading to increased
knowledge accumulation and productivity. Overall, good governance may offer a conducive economic condition for technological
enhancement, in relation to human and physical capital formation, which is fundamental to socioeconomic development.

3.2. Conceptual analysis of the interconnections between governance quality and socioeconomic conditions
In Fig. 1, the possible interconnections between governance quality and socioeconomic conditions are presented in conceptual form.
It is assumed that good governance will result in the entrenchment of a conducive business environment, which can give rise to proper
contract or copyright enforcement and market expansion. Consequently, this could engender the promotion of research and development with the increased public investment in infrastructure, thereby resulting in improved human and capital accumulation. The
improvement in the level of workers’ skills, coupled with enhanced technologies, would lead to increased productivity and, hence,
improved aggregate economic performance. Based on the previous section, as economic performance improves, socioeconomic conditions are likely to improve as well, which in turn may potentially stimulate the governance quality. However, these propositions are
only tenable if efﬁcient public spending is maintained (International Monetary Fund, 2015); as countries tackle the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, increasing efﬁciency seems critical to ensuring positive outcomes. Hence, the effective mitigation of
poor-governance risks (i.e., those in the socioeconomic cycle that involve a proactive approach toward addressing the perceived weak
quality of institutions) is viewed to be the major precondition for a functional governance–socioeconomic improvement framework
(International Monetary Fund, 2014).
This analysis is anchored in the Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) framework developed by the International
Monetary Fund to assist countries in strengthening critical infrastructure governance areas. The PIMA provides a holistic diagnostic tool
for measuring the state of infrastructure governance across countries with the assessment of economic development levels. In a macroeconomically sustainable pattern, this framework stresses that public investment promotes growth. It identiﬁes areas that governments can focus on (including the strengthening of institutional quality) to ensure better spending on public investment to improve
socioeconomic conditions. The PIMA framework adopts a systematic procedure to assess governance that helps countries to measure and
benchmark their institutional practices against those of their peers. Following International Monetary Fund (2018), from a macro
perspective, three key stages are considered critical for effective institutional processes: sustainable investment planning, the right
allocation of investment, and ensuring that projects are implemented on time and within the budget. Links between governance quality
and socioeconomic conditions point to the signiﬁcance of having strong institutions for the enhancement of public investment that will
guarantee improved social welfare and, in turn, all development in the economy. The pervasive weak governance structures in SSA,
therefore, may pose a great challenge to the region’s socioeconomic development efforts.

Fig. 1. Interconnections between good governance and socioeconomic development in sub-Saharan Africa.
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3.3. Econometric techniques and data source
In view of the fact that socioeconomic development indicators could be dynamic in nature, the explanatory variables could jointly
determine socioeconomic conditions, suggesting that endogeneity needs to be controlled for. Given this condition, and for a dynamic
panel data model, the suitable estimation is the System GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
This technique accounts for country-speciﬁc effects as well as the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables. To deal with
endogeneity, we use instruments based on the lagged values of the independent variables. A model involving lagged dependent variables among the regressors ought to be applied for the dynamic nature of the socioeconomic indicators. In this study, one lag period is
adopted for the dependent variable:
SOCit ¼ γSOCit1 þ β1 GOVit þ β2 Xit þ ϑit ;

(1)

where SOC represents the socioeconomic indicators, which include socioeconomic conditions (SOCD), a variable for the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and income per capita (INC; USD); GOV denotes the governance indicators, containing political stability
(POL) and voice and accountability (ACC); SOCit is the socioeconomic indicators in the current period; SOCit–1 represents socioeconomic
indicators in the previous period; GOVit is the governance indicators in the current period; γ is a scalar; β1 and β2 are the unknown
parameters; Xit denotes the vector of control variables, including GDP per capita (USD), domestic credit to the private sector (DCP;
percentage of GDP), and foreign direct investment (FDI), net inﬂows (percentage of GDP). It is assumed that ϑit, an error term, follows a
one-way error component model.
ϑit ¼ μi þ νit ;

(2)

where μi is the unobserved country-speciﬁc effects; and νit is the disturbance error term. μi and νit are independent of one another.
Because SOCit ¼ f(μi), likewise, SOCit–1 ¼ f(μi), hence, SOCit–1 is correlated with the error term. Under this condition, the ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation seems to be biased and inconsistent. With the System GMM, the ﬁrst-difference transformation eliminates the
possible individual effect. Speciﬁcally, taking the ﬁrst difference of Equation (1) and generalizing to an equation containing a lagged
dependent variable as the regressor will lead to:
ΔSOCit ¼ γΔSOCit1 þ β1 ΔGOVit þ β2 ΔXit þ Δϑit ;

(3)

where Δ is the difference operator. First differencing wipes out country-speciﬁc effects, but in terms of construction, it results in an
association between the differenced lagged socioeconomic development variable and the differenced error term. Consequently, lagged
levels of the independent series, with the incorporation of the lagged dependent variable as instruments (socioeconomic conditions
indicators), are employed for the analysis. This technique (System GMM) is considered to be more consistent and efﬁcient, as the lagged
levels of explanatory variables are valid instruments for the differenced independent variables. For example, Windmeijer (2005) argued
that, considering the asymptotic standard errors, the System GMM estimation performs much better than other panel estimation
techniques. In addition, we adopt PCSE estimation to enhance the robustness of the estimated results. Both techniques (System GMM
and PCSE) are appropriate because the number of time periods (T) is less than the number of cross-sections (N). It can also be argued that
the appropriateness of PCSE is ensured when disturbances create serial and contemporaneous correlations simultaneously; this
approach offers better and more efﬁcient estimated outcomes (Parks, 1967). PCSE estimation, therefore, provides more reliable results
compared to panel regression analyses (such as OLS or random- and ﬁxed-effects estimations) since the latter are highly susceptible to
possible endogeneity and simultaneity issues that are common features of most independent variables and that often result in biased and
inconsistent estimates (Deaton, 1995).
Given the importance of knowing the causal direction, the Granger causality test is explored within the framework of the panel
vector autoregressive model based on Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Lüetkepohl (1996) using the following set of
equations:
ΔSOCit ¼

p
X

α1j ΔSOCit þ

k¼1

ΔGOVit ¼

p
X
k¼1

p
X
k¼1

α1j ΔGOVit þ

α2k ΔGOVitk þ Δμit ;

p
X
k¼1

(4)

α2k ΔSOCitk þ Δμ2it ;

(5)

where μit and μ2it are the error terms; k ¼ 1 represents the minimum lag length selection starting from 1; p indicates the maximum lag
selected for the estimation; α1j and α2k are unknown estimated parameters for GOV and SOC, respectively. The error terms of the
transformed versions of Equations (4) and (5) satisfy the conditions of orthogonality. The analysis involves two models since the
governance indicators could be highly corrected. Model 1 includes ACC only, while POL is incorporated in Model 2. This was done to
avoid multicollinearity and to ascertain the respective effects of the variables on socioeconomic conditions in SSA.
Regarding the data used, the study covers the period 2005–2019 for 25 countries in SSA, including Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Congo, DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda. The scope and number of countries considered are
largely determined by data availability. We incorporate the control variable, GDP per capita, in the model based on Ehigiamusoe and
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Lean (2019), who indicated that human capital development could be inﬂuenced by the variable. DCP is also included following the
assertion that ﬁnancial sector development is critical to human capital development (Quartey, 2008; Odhiambo, 2010). Finally, FDI is
chosen because the variable has been considered signiﬁcant to economic development (Kheng et al., 2017; Zhuang, 2017; Fagbemi and
Osinubi, 2020). The description and sources of the data employed are stated in Table 1.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Given the summary statistics in Table 2, speciﬁc features of the variables are known. The mean value of SOCD is 3.15 and INC is
3667.13 USD in the selected countries, whereas ACC and POL are 0.78 and 1.00, respectively. These values reﬂect poor socioeconomic conditions and weak institutions in the region. The mean GDP per capita is 1853.79 USD, and its ﬂuctuation rate (i.e.,
standard deviation) is 2410.66 USD. The minimum values of SOCD, INC, ACC, and POL are 1.00, 518.84 USD, 1.47, and 2.70,
respectively, while their maximum values are 6.00, 17,260.46 USD, 0.65, and 1.10, respectively. All of the variables are signiﬁcant (P <
0.05), suggesting the potential of robust estimated outcomes. Regarding the correlation matrix presented in Table 3, the variables are
positively correlated with one another, with the exceptions of FDI and DCP, which are negatively correlated. This shows the possible
direction of correlation among the variables.
4.2. Analysis of the unit root test
Before beginning the analysis of the model, a set of unit root tests is generated to ascertain the order of integration of the series.
Because Levin and Lin (LL) requires a balanced panel as well as an independently generated time series, and for practical purposes, the
LL alternative hypothesis is overly restrictive. Thus, Im, Pesaran, and Shin test is considered for the study as it is less restrictive and more
suitable. Furthermore, following Maddala and Wu (1999), augmented Dickey–Fuller test and Phillips–Perron Fisher test are also conducted. Based on the test results presented in Table 4, we can conclude that the variables are appropriate for the study.
4.3. Panel-Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) and System Generalized Method of Moments (system GMM) estimations
In Table 5, both governance quality indicators (ACC and POL) are positive and signiﬁcant across models, suggesting that institutional
quality is by far the key driver of socioeconomic conditions (SOCD and INC). These results conﬁrm that better governance quality could
promote improved socioeconomic conditions, emphasizing the need for stronger institutions to improve the socioeconomic state.
Promoting accountability and ensuring a stable political system can result in the betterment of the standard of living, pointing out that
regions or countries with a lower governance quality could have a bigger and more challenging socioeconomic crisis. The ﬁndings
indeed show that higher governance quality could engender a high-quality socioeconomic development effect in Africa. This assertion
can be corroborated by the “spending effect hypothesis”. Based on Entelis (1976), to improve living conditions, government may use
Table 1
Description, measurement, and source of variables used in the study.
Variable

Code

Description and measurement

Source

Socioeconomic condition

SOCD

International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG, 2019)

Income per capita (USD)

INC

Political stability

POL

Voice and accountability

ACC

GDP per capita (USD)

GDP

Foreign direct investment, net
inﬂows (% of GDP)
Domestic credit to the private
sector (% of GDP)

FDI

An assessment of the socioeconomic pressures that could constrain government
action or fuel social dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three
subcomponents (unemployment, consumer conﬁdence, and poverty), and each of
them has a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of zero point. A
score of four points equates to very low risk and a score of zero point to very high
risk. A total of 12 points is possible.
Providing per capita values for gross domestic product (GDP) expressed in current
international dollars converted by the purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion
factor.
Measuring perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically
motivated violence, including terrorism. It is rated on a scale, as appropriate,
ranging between 2.5 and 2.5.
Representing the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as the freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and free media. It is rated on a scale, as appropriate, ranging between
2.5 and 2.5.
The sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy in addition
to any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the
products. It is measured without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
Representing net inﬂows—new investment inﬂows less disinvestment—in the
reporting economy from external (foreign) investors.
Referring to ﬁnancial resources provided to the private sector by ﬁnancial
corporations, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade
credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.

DCP

343

World development indicator
(The World Bank, 2020)
World Governance Indicators
(Kaufmann et al., 2010)
World Governance Indicators
(Kaufmann et al., 2010)

World development indicator
(The World Bank, 2020)

World development indicator
(The World Bank, 2020)
World development indicator
(The World Bank, 2020)
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Table 2
Statistical features of the variables.
Statistic

SOCD

INC (USD)

ACC

POL

GDP per capita (USD)

FDI (% of GDP)

DCP (% of GDP)

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
Skewness#
Kurtosis#
Jarque-Bera#
Signiﬁcance
Sum
Sum square deviation
Observations

3.15
3.00
6.00
1.00
1.05
0.49
2.83
12.47
0.00
960.84
334.86
305

3667.13
2083.49
17,260.46
518.84
4071.12
1.95
5.55
275.78
0.00
1,118,473.00
5.04
305

0.78
1.02
0.65
1.47
0.52
1.00
3.05
50.79
0.00
236.33
83.24
305

1.00
1.43
1.10
2.70
1.08
0.42
1.93
23.64
0.00
305.04
352.39
305

1853.79
784.04
9675.43
300.56
2410.66
2.08
5.95
330.22
0.00
565,406.90
1.77
305

5.91
2.72
103.34
6.06
11.42
5.40
37.90
16,965.92
0.00
1801.79
39,629.94
305

20.25
13.48
160.13
1.20
28.12
3.95
18.19
3725.33
0.00
6176.23
240,362.50
305

Note:

#

denotes non-dimensional statistics.

Table 3
Correlation analysis among the used variables.

SOCD
INC
ACC
POL
GDP per capita
FDI
DCP

SOCD

INC

ACC

POL

GDP per capita

FDI

DCP

1.00
0.55
0.29
0.47
0.51
0.08
0.30

1.00
0.46
0.53
0.15
0.12
0.46

1.00
0.56
0.46
0.11
0.61

1.00
0.50
0.09
0.27

1.00
0.09
0.50

1.00
0.09

1.00

Table 4
Results of the panel unit root tests.
Variable
SOCD
ICN
ACC
POL
GDP per capita
FDI
DCP

Level
First difference
Level
First difference
Level
First difference
Level
First difference
Level
First difference
Level
First difference
Level
First difference

Im, Pesaran, and Shin test (W-statistic)

ADF Fisher test (Choi Z-statistic)

Phillips–Perron Fisher test (Choi Z-statistic)

0.02
11.61***
6.44
7.20***
7.46**
–
14.51***
–
7.26***
–
1.32
11.96***
2.47
16.11**

0.04
11.26***
6.10
6.92***
9.10**
–
1.89
12.34***
6.49***
–
1.33
13.38***
4.81
13.98***

0.86
16.03***
5.03
7.20***
10.57**
–
2.91
13.92***
7.06***
–
2.16
12.05***
1.37
14.19***

Note: ADF means augmented Dickey–Fuller. ** and *** indicate the level of signiﬁcance at 5% and 1%, respectively. “-” represents the absence of the
ﬁrst difference.

resources more efﬁciently by ensuring sustainable spending on citizens’ critical needs, thereby reducing pressure for promoting
improved welfare practices. Using PCSE and System GMM, the evidence explains the fact that many African countries continue to
experience poor socioeconomic conditions due to a lack of democratic accountability and unstable governance, buttressing the argument that a continent (e.g., Africa) beset with problems of governance is likely to experience a paucity of social service provision
considered instrumental to well-being (African Capacity Building Foundation, 2018). Examples of weak governance abound in almost
all African countries and reducing socioeconomic challenges remain a critical issue (i.e., the need to stimulate improved socioeconomic
conditions is pressing, while the means to effect the needed change through governance is limited due to the efﬁciency gap). In this
context, these results corroborate the argument that institutions of political representation and accountability could be strong determinants of the level of socioeconomic development in SSA (Gray and Khan, 2010; AlBassam, 2013; Fayissa and Nsiah, 2013; Al
Mamun et al., 2017). Based on the analysis, SSA seems not to have the means of effective governance to seriously spur improved social
welfare. In this context, the strong nexus found between institutional quality and socioeconomic conditions has helped the relevance of
good governance in enhancing citizens’ well-being to gain further traction.
Regarding the control variables, the results indicate that GDP per capita and DCP, using the two techniques (PCSE and System GMM),
positively and signiﬁcantly inﬂuence socioeconomic conditions, including INC, while FDI—although the estimates are positive—is
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Table 5
Results of panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) and system generalized method of moments (system GMM).
Variable

PCSE

System GMM

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

SOCD (lag)

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

0.65***
(11.08)
–

–

INC (lag)

0.67***
(10.79)
–

ACC

–

–

0.06** (3.12)

–

0.13** (3.11)

–

0.05** (2.85)

–

GDP per capita

0.13** (2.58)

0.01***
(5.26)
0.05* (1.69)

0.11**
(3.14)
–

0.61***
(6.01)
–

POL

0.03***
(4.81)
–

0.54***
(7.91)
0.21** (3.22)

0.05** (2.87)

0.01* (2.34)
0.21** (2.15)
0.04 (0.11)
0.56
305
25

0.11* (1.88)
0.13** (2.71)
0.22 (0.71)
0.54
305
25

0.22***
(5.04)
0.21 (0.88)
0.23** (2.52)
0.20** (2.53)
0.55
305
25

0.01*** (5.62)

FDI
DCP
Constant
R2
Observations
Number of
countries

0.12**
(3.01)
0.13 (1.15)
0.41* (1.55)
0.12* (1.66)
0.57
305
25

1.02 (0.19)
0.04** (3.27)
0.37** (3.22)
–
257
25

0.06 (0.11)
0.01** (3.11)
1.21** (2.91)
–
257
25

0.17***
(4.11)
0.01 (0.17)
0.19* (1.56)
0.13* (1.58)
–
257
25

0.41***
(4.21)
0.25** (2.96)
0.10 (0.61)
0.23* (1.51)
0.17** (2.01)
–
257
25

Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values. ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Models 1 and 2 display results
for the socioeconomic condition variable with the inclusion of ACC and POL as the independent variables, respectively. Models 3 and 4 display results
for income per capita with the inclusion of ACC and POL as the explanatory variables, respectively. “-” represents no data.

found to be signiﬁcant only when the PCSE approach is used. The non-signiﬁcance of FDI under the System GMM could be a result of
inadequate FDI inﬂows or the misallocation of foreign capital inﬂows in some countries (Fagbemi and Osinubi, 2020). The direction of
the relationship between the control variables (GDP per capita, DCP, and FDI) and socioeconomic conditions is similar to the anticipated
outcome. This suggests that the improved well-being of Africans could be driven by these variables (GDP per capita, DCP, and FDI). In
accordance, the argument that improving economic performance can result in improved living conditions (Ehigiamusoe and Lean, 2019)
has been further established by the study. Furthermore, increased access to credit in the economy can stimulate business activities,
thereby leading to improved human capital development, which is in line with previous estimates (Quartey, 2008; Odhiambo, 2010),
while increasing FDI inﬂows can catalyze accelerated socioeconomic development in SSA. Indeed, these ﬁndings point to the signiﬁcance of increasing the efﬁciency and effectiveness of these variables—both the governance quality indicators and the control variables.
In the diagnostic test (see Table 6), Pesaran cross-sectional dependence (Pesaran, 2004) test is carried out as well as a heteroskedasticity test. Both tests satisfy the required condition of the absence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Regarding the
System GMM, the results of the Arellano–Bond test for the second-order serial correlation show that there is no second-order serial
correlation, while the number of instruments is smaller than the number of observations. The test of overidentifying restrictions (Sargan
test) also indicates the validity of the instruments in the model. Overall, these tests validate the rule and the robustness of the estimates.

4.4. Panel causality test
To identify and further understand the instrumental interconnections between governance quality and socioeconomic conditions in
SSA, we present the results of a panel causality test in Table 7. The results show that both institutional quality indicators used in the
model (ACC and POL) are Granger cause socioeconomic indicators (SOCD and INC) employed in the model. Similarly, causation also
holds in the opposite direction, suggesting that bi-directional causality exists between socioeconomic conditions and governance
quality. These results reveal that the state of governance (either weak or strong) could play a key role in triggering serious socioeconomic crises. Moreover, strong socioeconomic conditions could enhance public-sector performance through improving efﬁciency and
productivity, thereby stimulating governance effectiveness. This argument is in line with the ﬁndings of Chong and Calderon (2000) and
Emara and Jhonsa (2014) who contended that governance quality and socioeconomic conditions are mutually reinforcing. These
conclusions are also buttressed by the PIMA framework, which explains how governance can be strengthened to enhance public investment in infrastructure, in turn stimulating overall economic performance. On the other hand, an improvement in socioeconomic
conditions could result in better governance and vice versa. In light of this, governance quality is viewed as a vital ingredient in achieving
necessary development outcomes.
In sum, the ﬁndings suggest that ACC as well as POL are important for the improvement of socioeconomic conditions in countries of
SSA. They explain how, in countries with stronger governance, citizens could enjoy better living conditions, while in countries with
weaker governance, citizens might experience the opposite. These results are important and reasonable, as they are critical to
strengthening our understanding of the impact of governance on socioeconomic conditions in countries of SSA. For example, where
governance deﬁciencies affect the allocation and implementation of social and physical projects, the resulting misallocation and poor
implementation would also impede the delivery and impact of such projects. Hence, governance problems besetting many African
countries could be responsible for the continent’s socioeconomic conditions. Meaningful development outcomes could be difﬁcult to
attain with the pervasiveness of political instability and the lack of transparency and accountability across countries in SSA.
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Table 6
Results of diagnostic test.
Variable

Pesaran cross-sectional dependence
Heteroskedasticity
A–Bond AR (1)
A–Bond AR (2)
Sargan test

PCSE

System GMM

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.29
0.21
–
–
–

0.42
0.35
–
–
–

0.13
0.42
–
–
–

0.25
0.33
–
–
–

–
–
5.21 (0.00)
1.03 (0.13)
46.21 (0.31)

–
–
5.18 (0.00)
1.05 (0.28)
49.17 (0.14)

–
–
4.97 (0.00)
1.12 (0.31)
47.02 (0.34)

–
–
5.32 (0.00)
1.22 (0.33)
49.01 (0.23)

Note: Figures in the brackets are P-values. A–Bond AR (1) means Arellano–Bond test for the ﬁrst-order serial correlation, while A–Bond AR (2) represents Arellano–Bond test for the second-order serial correlation. “-” represents no data.

Table 7
Summary of the panel causality test results.
Causality

Wald test

Inference of causality

SOCD→ACC
SOCD→POL
INC→ACC
INC→POL
ACC→SOCD
POL→SOCD
ACC→INC
POL→INC

4.11**
5.41**
4.32**
5.78**
9.20***
11.15***
8.01***
6.57**

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: The symbol “→” indicates direction of causality. ** and *** indicate the level of signiﬁcance at 5% and 1%, respectively.

5. Conclusions and recommendations
Given that governance quality plays a critical role in determining the socioeconomic conditions across countries, this study examines
the interconnections between governance and socioeconomic conditions in SSA. Based on the analysis, we can conclude that the
pervasiveness of institutional problems in many African countries has been responsible for the poor socioeconomic conditions in the
continent. Indeed, the ﬁndings indicate that bad governance results in poor living conditions across countries. In this context, the
paucity of good social services could be exacerbated by bad governance, as sustainable socioeconomic development depends on
governance quality. Hence, understanding major challenges in Africa is of utmost importance for addressing the issue of governance in
African development. The study’s ﬁndings, therefore, identify governance problems in SSA as a big challenge to the development of the
region’s socioeconomic conditions. A state that can effectively manage its affairs and implement the policies it devises is in need of good
governance quality.
It is suggested that African countries need to streamline governing systems toward engendering improved socioeconomic conditions.
The introduction and implementation of transformative policies through effective governance are also necessary for ensuring critical
structural changes and increasing social service provision, and there should be a proactive identiﬁcation of ineffective policies and
procedures by policymakers to enhance their meaningful impact. Unless these recommendations are considered, the worst socioeconomic conditions around the globe may be increasingly found in Africa.
This study has covered how socioeconomic conditions are inﬂuenced by governance quality in SSA. However, while the data based
on the governance index from the World Governance Indicators are employed, alternative data could be obtained from other sources to
further research in this area. This will help broaden the literature on the governance–socioeconomic development linkage. In addition,
employing other relevant estimation techniques to provide additional evidence is necessary for the advancement of good governance in
Africa.
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